Regression (i) reports all developing countries (subject to data availability), regression (ii) excludes from the sample developing-economies countries that are characterized by financial openness that exceeds 100 percent, or by trade openness that exceeds 60 percent, and small island economies. Finally, regression (iii) deals only with the OECD countries. The first two regressions indicate a highly significant positive association between changes in financial and commercial openness in developing countries. This effect in the OECD countries is positive, but at a substantially lower significance level.
In Aizenman and Ilan Noy (2003) , annual data are used to investigate the impact of political economy and other structural variables on the links between trade and financial openness. An extended version of our model, where political-economy considerations determine the efficiency of the tax system, suggests that democracies are associated with lower financial openness. 4 Our empirical investigation, * 317 Social Sciences 1, Department of Economics, University of California-Santa Cruz, 1156 High St., Santa Cruz, CA 95064, and NBER (e-mail: jaizen@ucsc.edu Rodrik (1999), and Thomas Hellmann et al. (2000) for skeptical assessments of the gains from financial liberalization. For studies dealing with the financial instability associated with capital-account opening, see the papers in Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey Frankel (2002) . On the association between financial integration and financial crises see Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (1998), Guillermo Calvo (1998) , and Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999) .
2 Financial openness measures (gross private capital inflows ϩ gross private outflows) ϫ 100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Shang-Jin Wei and Yi Wu (2002) , and Eswar Prasad et al. (2003) . Trade openness measures (exports ϩ imports) ϫ 100/GDP, using the World Development Indicators (WDI) data. 3 The inclusion of GDP per capita as an explanatory variable is suggested by the linkages between GDP per capital level and financial depth. 4 Following the approach of Alex Cukierman et al. (1992) , one expects less-polarized societies and better-functioning democracies to be characterized by more efficient taxcollection systems. Applying this conjecture, a more efficient tax system would be associated also with lower tax reported in Table 2 , confirms that lagged trade has a highly significant positive effect on financial openness, whereas democratic regimes are associated with lower financial openness.
5 For developing countries, we find that a one-standarddeviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5-percent increase in de facto financial openness (percentage of GDP), a one-standard-deviation increase in the democratization index reduces financial openness by 3.5 percent, and a one-standard-deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 3-percent reduction of financial openness. Our main results with respect to commercial openness and the political regime remain significant even when a de jure measure of financial openness is included (the de jure coefficient turned out to be insignificant). The empirical analysis in Aizenman and Noy (2003) leads us to conclude that a more openly competitive, free, and inclusive political system will lead to lower levels of de facto financial openness after controlling for incomes, macroeconomic policy, and commercial openness.
Needless to say, these regressions are only suggestive and do not provide information on the economic forces inducing the existence of linkages between the two openness measures. I argue that the pragmatic case for financial reforms in the presence of growing trade integration follows from the endogenous publicfinance linkages between financial and trade openness. I show that the relatively costly collection of taxes in developing countries implies that financial repression would be part of the menu of taxes. The impact of financial repression is to allow the government to recycle its domestic debt at a lower real interest rate than would have prevailed with full financial integration, and to tax the option of saving in foreign assets. Hence, one should view the drop rates, thereby reducing the attractiveness of capital flight. It can be verified that the net effect of improving the tax system is to lower the incidence of capital flight, thereby reducing de facto financial integration.
5 Any one-point increase in the democratization index (out of the 20-point difference between full autocracy and democracy) reduces financial openness (international financial flows) by almost one-half percentage point of GDP. The effect is about half as large when we do not control for the level of corruption (reported in Table 2 , column 3). Aizenman and Noy (2003) . The dependent variable is the sum of financial inflows and outflows (as a percentage of GDP). The estimation uses the Prais-Winsten algorithm assuming AR(1) error terms. The corruption index runs from Ϫ6 (low probability/risk of encountering corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt). The democracy/autocracy index runs between Ϫ10 (fully autocratic) and ϩ10 (fully democratic). ALL denotes the whole sample; DEV denotes the developing-countries sample. † Statistically significant at the 10-percent level. * Statistically significant at the 5-percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
in the interest rate facing domestic savers as an implicit tax on domestic savings. 6 This tax provides the impetus for capital flight, in search of a higher return on savings. A frequent mechanism facilitating capital flight is over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. 7 The scale of these activities is proportional to the commercial openness of the economy. This in turn implies that greater trade openness increases the effective financial openness, by providing more opportunities for capital flight.
This linkage, however, is subject to the costly control of the fiscal authorities. Curtailing illicit capital flows requires spending resources on monitoring and enforcement of existing capital controls. Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of capital controls would increase with the resources spent on monitoring and enforcement per additional dollar of international trade.
I characterize the pattern of taxes that would maximize consumers' utility, subject to the need to finance a given fiscal outlay (this process is equivalent to minimizing the deadweight loss associated with a given fiscal expenditure). I show that more costly collection of taxes and lower commercial openness increase the level of financial repression adopted by the policymaker. A key result of this framework is that greater commercial openness reduces the financial repression chosen by developing countries. This follows from the observation that greater commercial openness increases the effective cost of enforcing financial repression, thereby reducing the usefulness of financial repression as an implicit tax. Hence, financial reforms may be the by-product of greater trade integration. My model also suggests that financial reforms are sustainable only if they do not ignore the fiscal implications of the drop in fiscal revenue, and the consequent increase in the cost of recycling the public debt. Hence, sustainability of financial reform requires finding alternative means of taxation, or reducing government expenditure. This work is related to the sequencing of reforms literature (see Edwards and Sweder van Wijnbergen, 1986) . Its main conclusion is that optimal financial and commercial openness are intertwined, and that the pressure to open the financial system is a by-product of successful trade integration.
I. The Model
I consider a developing country where fiscal outlays are financed by means of two taxes: a direct income tax and an implicit tax induced by capital controls. Both taxes are costly. The income tax is associated with deadweight losses due to collection and enforcement costs. Similarly, enforcing capital controls entails costly prevention of illicit capital flight.
I illustrate the design of optimal policies by considering a small, two-goods, two-periods economy. The utility of the representative consumer is given by a conventional neoclassical utility,
where X is the domestic good, and Y is the foreign (imported) good. Consumers are endowed each period with X units of the domestic good and start period 1 with D Ϫ1 (1 ϩ r Ϫ1 ) income from the old bonds that are repaid in period 1. The authorities tax the income from the endowment X at a rate t. The consumer saves D in period 1, allocating it between domestic and foreign bonds, D and D*, respectively. The authorities impose capital control in the form of a tax on the foreign bond. Let denote the tax rate, implying that the domestic interest rate, r, is determined by 1 ϩ r ϭ (1 ϩ r*)(1 Ϫ ). Consequently, the tax determines the premium between the foreign and domestic real interests, ϭ (r* Ϫ r)/(1 ϩ r*). The premium is also a measure of the intensity of financial controls. The existence of the premium implies that consumers would have the incentive to engage in illicit capital flight, in order to avoid the tax. This capital flight is intermediated via the trade account; hence its potential magnitude would be determined by the volume of imports (Y 1 ) and exports (X Ϫ X 1 ).
Preventing illicit capital flows induced by a premium requires spending X on enforcement. I assume that enforcement and the resultant premium are linked by the following reduced form:
This formulation assumes that larger trade openness requires an equi-proportionate increase in enforcement in order to support the given premium. It also recognizes the diminishing marginal efficacy of enforcement. The tax on foreign bonds and the enforcement of financial repression implies that the consumer is indifferent between the domestic and the foreign bond. Enforcement of the income tax is associated with collection cost per one dollar of gross taxes, implying that the net tax collected by a tax t is (1 Ϫ )tX . The consolidated intertemporal budget constraint facing the authorities can be reduced to
Financial repression imposes taxes on domestic savings, D* ϩ D ϭ D , at the premium rate, . This tax has two components. First, it taxes foreign bonds, D*, directly, at the premium rate. In addition, it reduces the cost of financing the domestic debt, D, at the premium rate. Unlike in the private sector, the effective real interest rate facing the fiscal authorities equals the foreign one. The policymaker chooses the tax rates t, and the enforcement that would maximize the utility of the representative agent, subject to the fiscal and the private budget constraints, and the first order conditions characterizing consumer's consumption patterns. The following claim characterizes the pattern of optimal taxes and resulting financial repression (see Aizenman [2003] for the derivation).
CLAIM 1: Discussion: I assumed away uncertainty. The analysis can be extended to the case where monitoring implies random interception of illicit capital flight. Such an extension implies the existence of well-defined demands for the domestic and the foreign bonds (recall that in the present model, the two bonds are perfect substitutes in equilibrium). Yet, this modification would not change the main results dealing with the factors determining the optimal level of financial repression (see Aizenman and Noy, 2003) . I simplified the analysis by assuming the same income tax (t) in both periods. Allowing for intertemporal variation of the income tax would imply that the taxes are set to equate the marginal tax distortion across both time periods, but this modification would not impact the characterization of financial repression. Another simplifying assumption has been a constant marginal collection cost of income taxes. A plausible alternative is increasing marginal collection cost. The main modification induced by this change would be that higher outstanding public debt, or higher fiscal expenditure, would increase the optimal level of financial repression.
My openness measure is utility based, being related to the consumption weight of the foreign good. One may argue that the openness of the economy is impacted both by the supply and demand side. Yet, the logic of this discussion is unrelated to the exact determinants of openness, as it follows from the enforcement technology [equation (2)]. To illustrate this point, one can focus on the dual case, where there is only one traded good, the production function is CobbDouglas in the domestic and the foreign input, and trade is determined by the demand for imported inputs. It can be shown for this case that an exact version of the above claim continues to hold (see Aizenman, 2003) .
A fair criticism of the public-finance approach described above is that it more accurately describes homogeneous countries, where the policymaker is guided by the interests of the median voter, and there is little political uncertainty pertaining to competing parties and competing interest groups. Hence, it is useful to consider the polar case, corresponding to high degrees of opportunism and political uncertainty. One expects that most countries are characterized by regimes on a continuum between these two polar cases. Aizenman and Noy (2003) illustrate that the two approaches may lead to similar links between macroeconomic and political-economy variables and de facto financial openness. We show there the similarity of the predictions of the opportunistic and the public-finance approaches. In both cases, less cohesive social organization, greater political uncertainty, and greater commercial openness are associated with higher de facto financial openness.
II. Concluding Remarks
The de facto financial openness is the outcome of both efficiency and political-economy considerations; hence one should be careful in attaching normative implications to these findings without having a good model of the economy. Yet, the results reported in this paper may provide some guidelines to policymakers. Trade opening of countries that repress their financial system will inevitably lead to financial opening, increasing thereby the cost of public debt. Hence, sustainability of the resultant financial opening requires a deep fiscal restructuring. Argentina stands as a sad example of this logic. There, the impact of adopting financial opening without a deep enough fiscal restructuring was an increase in the cost of refinancing the public debt. In general, while it may take some time for the debt to build up sufficiently to induce a crisis, at the end of the process financial repression and inflation remain the default taxes used by weak fiscal systems.
